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The Invasion of
Czechoslovakia: 1968f
During the night of August 20-21, approximately 175,000 "Warsaw
Pact" troops1 crossed Czech borders to occupy Prague and other strategic
locations in Czechoslovakia. World response to the invasion was in-
stantaneous. Virtually all the nations of the free world, three Communist
states (one a member of the Warsaw Pact), and leaders of the French,
Italian and Swiss Communist parties condemned the invasion. Author-
itative Czech organs-the Central Committee of the Czech Communist
Party, the Presidium of the National Assembly, the National Assembly,
the Czech Foreign Ministry, the Czech Socialist Party, the Slovak Com-
munist Party-denounced the invasion as a "violation of international law
and the United Nations Charter". The Czech Government and the extraor-
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tThis article, which was prepared as a working paper for forums conducted by state andlocal bar associations of the American Bar Association, attempts to state the principal legal
issues relating to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Although it concludes that the invasion is
unlawful, it is not intended to be a brief against the Soviet Union or the other members of the
Warsaw Pact; if it were, the case would be urged far more strongly. For pedagogical purposes,
the article presents the Soviet justifications of the invasion with more force and clarity -and
with more frequent reference to legal norms-than have Soviet diplomats or Government
sources. For an almost macabre example of Soviet argumentation, see Press Group of Soviet
Journalists, ON EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA (1968). In order not to burden the
practicing lawyer, the within article omits most citations.
For the history of the events surrounding the invasion, the author has relied principally on
R. LITTELL (Ed.), THE CZECH BLACK BOOK (1969); C. CHAPMAN, AUGUST 2iST: THE RAPE
OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA (1968); The New York Times, in particular, T. Szulc, An Account of
First Seven Days of The Soviet-Led Intervention in Czechoslovakia, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2,
1968 at 6; and a series of translations of Czechoslovak radio broadcasts by the United States.
Full citations to any omitted sources for facts stated in the text will be furnished by the author
on request.
'These Warsaw Pact troops (occasionally referred to as the "Warsaw Pact invaders")
were from the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German
Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics.
Estimates of the total number of Warsaw Pact invaders in Czechoslovakia reached
650,000; the more realistic number appears to be about 500,000. See T. Szulc, Prague Aids
Say German Red Units Left by Third Day, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1968 at 1, col. I.
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. I
The Invasion of Czechoslovakia: 1968
dinary 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia de-
manded speedy withdrawal of the occupation forces.
Despite the almost universal condemnation of the invasion, not one
Government supported its position with a comprehensive examination of
the relevant prescriptions of international law. Governments frequently,
but not invariably, charged the Warsaw Pact invaders with violations of
international law and the United Nations Charter. These assertions of law,
however, were phrased at the highest levels of abstraction; the invasion
was characterized simply as an "armed intervention," an "international
crime," and a violation of the principle of "non-interference in the affairs of
other states." For example, Delegates to the Security Council, in debates
of August 21, 22, 23 and 24, rested their "legal" arguments on brief
references to the United Nations Charter and to General Assembly resolu-
tion 2131 (XX). The United States delegate to the Special Committee on
Principles of International Law analyzed the invasion in light of the prin-
ciples of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, and made only the
briefest mention of traditional and developing norms of international law.2
Nowhere were the prescriptions of international law ignored as much as
in the arguments of the Soviet Union.3 Indeed, Soviet justifications of the
invasion, which made only the most minimal and half-hearted references to
international law, were often a mockery of the propositions on which they
were based. Most notable was the Soviet production of an unsigned docu-
ment that implied that Czech leaders "invited" the Warsaw Pact forces to
enter Czechoslovakia; this "invitation" was soon followed by a Soviet
attempt to form a Czech government to issue it.
Lest the limited references to international law be thought justified
because the invasion was such a clear violation of international law, it is
well to recall that only minimal sanctions were imposed on the Soviet
Union following the invasion. Despite the almost universal condemnation
of the invasion, leaders of the world community made only modest use of
contemporary institutions capable of imposing (albeit remedial) sanctions
on the Warsaw Pact invaders. The United Nations Security Council de-
bated the Czech question for only four days. As may have been expected,
a resolution condemning the "armed intervention" fell before a Soviet veto.
2H. Reis, Legal Aspects of the Invasion and Occupation oj Czechoslhvakia, 49 Dept. of
State Bull. 394 (1968).3Translations of the principal Soviet arguments are collected in The Joint Committee on
Slavic Studies, THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS (hereinafter cited as "CDSP"),
Vol. XX, No. 34 (September II, 1968). See also ON EVENTS IN CZECHOSILOVAKIA, supra,
note t.
The author has not attempted an exhaustive analysis of the justifications of the Czech-
oslovak invasion that were pressed by Warsaw Pact invaders other than the Soviet Union.
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Council members, however, did not push through a proposed resolution,
procedural in nature and thus not subject to the veto, which would have
authorized the Secretary-General to make inquiries about the personal
safety of the Czech leaders. An emergency session of the General Assem-
bly was not called, as had been the case when the Soviet Union intervened
in Hungary in 1956. There was no attempt to have a special committee of
the General Assembly investigate the invasion by interviewing such men
as Ota Sik, a Deputy Premier and economic planner, who left Czech-
oslovakia after the invasion. No action was taken to secure passage of a
General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion. It is true that there
has been a gradual increase in allegiances to NATO, and an enlargement of
NATO forces, but these actions have been justified principally by refer-
ence to the need to redress the balance of power in Europe, and not to the
requirements (or sanctions) of international law.4
Only limited sanctions were imposed by individual States acting outside
international or multinational institutions. West European response to the
invasion was "muted to an extraordinary degree". 5 Some trade credits and
deliveries to the Soviet Union and its allies were delayed, and certain
cultural exchanges were postponed. The Netherlands cancelled a proposed
tour by the Mayor of Moscow, and Denmark reportedly withdrew an
invitation previously extended to the Rumanian President and Communist
Party leader. Soviet naval ships were refused entry to West Baltic ports
and numerous states relaxed immigration restrictions for Czech 6migr6s.
However, sanctions which could result in major value deprivations for the
Warsaw Pact invaders, have not been taken.
The United States' reaction to the invasion has hardly been dedicated to
molding world opinion to encourage respect for the development of inter-
national law. President Johnson, in a brief and restrained statement on the
invasion, noted that the invasion was a violation of the United Nations
Charter, but beyond that, made no reference whatsoever to international
law. When confronted with the Soviet Union's ideological justification for
the invasion-a justification which, as will be shown has no foundation in
international law-Secretary of State Rusk pressed for clarification of the
justification, instead of simply demonstrating its incompatibility with tradi-
tional norms of international law.6
4 H. Cleveland, NA70AJterthe Invasion, 47 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 251 (1969).
5 Editorial, NATO's Czech Reprisal, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1969 at 18, col. I.6Secretary Rusk's speech to the General Assembly is excerpted in N.Y. Times, Oct. 4,
1968 at 14, and reprinted in full in LIX Dept. of State Bulletin, Oct. 21, 1968 at 405. See also
Secretary Rusk's speech Some Myths and Misconceptions About U.S. Foreign Policy, LIX
Dept. of State Bulletin, Oct. 7, 1968, at 350.
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The widespread failure to make detailed reference to international law,
coupled with the minimal sanctions imposed on the Warsaw Pact invaders,
leads one to question whether appropriate use was made of international
law in responding to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This paper seeks to
demonstrate, in modest fashion, that the principles of international law-in
particular, the doctrines of "aggression", "intervention" and
"self-defense" 
-though formulated in highly flexible terms, have an abiding
relevance to this controversy.
To support its thesis, this article first places the Czechoslovak invasion
in its historical context, with brief focus on the liberalization beginning in
January of 1968. Its second task is to review, the doctrines of permissible
and impermissible coercion, and to analyze the legality of the invasion
itself. In its concluding section, this paper attempts an impressionistic
examination of the relevance of international law to the invasion of Czech-
oslovakia.
I The Invasion in Historical Context
Although the Czechs and Slovaks established one of the earliest possible
entities in Central Europe, their history has been marked by foreign domi-
nation, religious persecution, and political impotence. These factors, a
recent study hypothesizes, have led to a basic national characteristic,
namely, "an attitude of acceptance (of authority) on the surface and of
resistance within, with individual and national survival being the overriding
aim." 7
Communism has been Czechoslovakia's most recent authoritarian struc-
ture. Following the 1948 coup d'etat, for almost twenty years Czech-
oslovakia was the "most pliant" 8 of the Soviet satellites. From 1953 to
1968, power was concentrated in the hands of Antonin Novotny, who was
First Secretary of CCP Central Committee from 1953 to January, 1968,
President of the Republic from 1957 to May, 1968, and Chairman of the
National Front from April, 1959 to 1968. Novotny was a committed
Stalinist. Under his guidance in foreign affairs, the "Czechoslovak regime
did nothing unless told to do so by Moscow and ... everything Moscow
wanted it to do". 9 The trends toward destalinization and polycentrism
within the Soviet bloc, which so importantly affected the Communist
7Z. Elias and J. Netik, Czechoslovakia (hereinafter cited as Elias & Netik), in W.
Griffith, Ed., COMMUNISM IN EUROPE, vol. 2 at 155, 161 (1967).
8Z. BRZEZINSKI, THE SOVIET BLOC 436 (1967).
9 Elias & Netik, supra note 7, at 232.
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r6gimes in Hungary, Poland and Rumania, had but little initial impact in
Czechoslovakia.
An economic crisis in the early 1960s, however, together with the
intra-bloc trend to polycentrism, led to disaffection within the Novotny
r6gime. By the mid-60s, "the rule of dogmatism had reached its peak.... 10
"A new economic program entrusted more decision-making capacity to the
Government-as opposed to the Party .... Pragmatism took the place of
dogmatism in politics, in the economy, and even in ideology"." The Com-
munist Party "was no longer the all-seeing, all-powerful, unquestioned
authority that it had once been.' 12
Novotny was unable to mollify the demands for reform within Czech-
oslovakia, and on January 5, 1968 Alexander Dubcek replaced him as
First Secretary of the Communist Party. Two trends toward liberalization
marked the eight-month "Czechoslovak spring" which followed. First, the
Communist Party consciously sought a greater distribution of political and
economic power. The Party encouraged greater political independence
among the Slovaks by proposing a federalized State. It attempted to insure
that "in actual practice" the National Assembly would be "the supreme
organ of state power in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic' 3 and that
the Council of Ministers would function effectively as the principal execu-
tive organ of the State. It indicated a willingness to tolerate the formation
of political and social organizations outside the National Front. It encour-
aged workers to participate to a greater extent than previously in the
management of the economic organizations employing them. It promised
that economic enterprises would be relatively independent from State or-
gans, and there were even indications that a "free market", rather than the
State (or the Party), would determine the goals of production. Most im-
portantly, there was greater and freer participation in decision-making at all
levels of policy formulation.
The second major trend in the Czechoslovak spring was an effort to
formulate and safeguard civil rights for the people of Czechoslovakia.
Freedom of speech and press were insured, and the censorship system was
abolished. Police relaxed their enforcement of laws restricting freedom of




"3The Action Program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, adopted at the
plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on April
5, 1968 (hereinafter cited as "Action Program"), translated in P. ELLO, CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S
BLUEPRINT FOR FREEDOM 89, 129 (1968).
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of the Interior, the once dreaded policy ministry."' 14 It promised "neces-
sary safeguards" for civil servants, and encouraged the rehabilitation of
individuals "unlawfully condemned and persecuted" in the Party purges of
the early 1950s. "The legal policy of the Party was based on the principle
that... the basic guarantee of legality is proceedings in a court which are
independent of political factors and are bound only by law.' 15
Both of these trends toward liberalization meant a change in the role of
the Communist Party. The "leading role" of the Party was no longer to be
based on the "monopolistic concentration of power in the hands of Party
bodies."'1 6 The Party's goal was not to practice "its leading role by ruling
the society but by most devotedly serving its free, progressive socialist
development."'17
By March of 1968 it was apparent that the Czechoslovak trend toward
liberalization had created considerable anxiety within the Soviet bloc. On
both a bilateral and multilateral basis, Communist leaders met to discuss
the Czechoslovak liberalization, its consequences for the Soviet bloc, and
measures that could (or should) be taken against it. In late May, Prime
Minister Kosygin apparently sought a Czechoslovak commitment to prohi-
bit anti-Soviet comments in the Czechoslovak press. A mid-July meeting of
the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and the Soviet
Union produced a letter to the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party-a letter which warned the Party to retain its "guiding
role" in society, and which advised an "offensive against rightist and
antisocialist forces", the "cessation of the activities of all political organiza-
tions that oppose socialism", and the "Party's assumption of control over
the mass media". 18 A studiously prolonged Warsaw Pact exercise on
Czechoslovak territory, and Russian troop maneuvers near the Czech
border, pressured Dubcek to accept these proposals, and it appears that in
negotiations at Cierna and Bratislava, he did so in small part.
But Dubcek's tactics in early August-he actively sought support from
Rumania and Yugoslavia-belied a wholehearted acquiescence in the So-
viet (and certainly the Polish and East German) demands. Dubcek's seem-
ing reluctance to implement the Cierna and Bratislava agreements, and a
power shift within the Soviet Politburo, appear to have triggered the Soviet
invasion.
14 E. Taborsky, The New Era in Czechoslovakia (hereinafter cited as "Taborsky"), 17
(I 1) EAST EUROPE 19, 23 (1968).
15Action Program, supra note 13 at 133.161d. at 110.
171d.
18The letter is titled To the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, and was
printed in Pravda on July 18, 1968 at 1-2. It is translated in XX (2) CDSP 4-6 (1968).
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The key task in appraising the legality of the invasion is to determine
whether the deployment of Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia was a
lawful or an unlawful use of force. It is to the doctrines of "permissible
coercion" and "impermissible coercion", thus, that we now turn.
II. Permissible and Impermissible Coercion19
During the course of the last two centuries, scholars, jurists and national
and international officials have invoked a small number of legal doctrines in
their attempts to restrict, or to justify, resort to coercion in inter-state
relations. Employment of these doctrines has not been consistent; but a
rigid uniformity is not to be expected in the relatively disorganized world
community, in which officials of both the attacking state and the target
state 20 invoke these doctrines to justify or oppose use of coercion, and
other members of the world community judge these claims to legality.
Whatever the confusions in usage, these doctrines have had two general
functions. The first has been to distinguish between permissible and imper-
missible coercion. Words such as "aggression", "intervention", "retali-
ation", "measures short of war" and "delicts" have pointed to types of
inter-state coercion which the world community (or a claimant) has re-
garded as illegal. In complement to these concepts, terms such as
"self-defense", "pacific blockade", "self-help", "interposition" and "retor-
tion" often characterized lawful responses by a target state to illegal coer-
cion.
The second general function of these doctrines has been to establish a
nexus between impermissible coercion on the one hand, and permissible
coercion, on the other. This nexus, in a most simplistic statement of
traditional theory, has operated to limit the type and degree of coercion
which may be employed legally by an attacking state. For example, by
authorizing the target state to respond in "self-defense" to "aggression",
the nexus imposed a community-authorized deterrent and sanction on the
attacking state. In parallel fashion, the nexus imposed a requirement of
proportionality on the type and degree of coercion that might legally be
employed by a target state in response to impermissible coercion. It is
19The distinction between permissible and impermissible coercion is developed, com-
prehensively and with extraordinary insight, in M. McDOUGAL AND F. FELICIANO, LAW AND
MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961) (hereinafter cited as McDoUGAL & FELICIANO).20Use of the labels "attacking state" and "target state" serves the purpose of con-
venience only. The author does not mean to suggest that international conflicts have only two
states as participants, that the participants in international conflicts are always "states," or
that in any given situation it will be possible to sharply distinguish between the "attacker" and
the "target."
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accordingly now generally recognized as unlawful to remedy a relatively
inconsequential "delict" by making extensive use of military force, under a
claim of "self-defense", to destroy or acquire substantial resources in a
target state. In consequence, doctrines about permissible and impermis-
sible coercion are found in pairs, ranging along a continuum with highly
intense coercion at the one extreme, and at the other, that minimal degree
of coercion normally found in interstate relations. "Aggression" has gener-
ally marched hand-in-hand with "self-defense", "measures short of war"
with "self-help", and a "wrong" or a "delict" with "intervention".
A. Unlawful Use of Coercion
To disentangle the doctrines about permissible and impermissible coer-
cion, one must focus first on impermissible coercion, and, in particular,
aggression and intervention. Despite futile efforts to define these terms,
and despite their generality and the great number and variety of factual
situations to which they may be applied, it should not be thought that they
are without a "core" content. In fact a community consensus about the
illegality of certain types of coercion in inter-state relations has evolved; it
finds explicit expression in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter,
which forbids the "threat or use of force in international relations against
the political independence or the territorial integrity" of a target state. This
consensus developed initially from the widely shared belief that it was
essential to proscribe the more highly intense forms of coercion. It has
expanded, however, to prohibit relatively intense coercion directed against
target states, unless the state employing coercion is acting pursuant to a
United Nations decision or in self-defense. To determine the contours and
limits of this consensus, the historical development of the doctrines of
"aggression" and "intervention" is surveyed briefly hereunder.
I) AGGRESSION
Contemporary prohibitions against aggression have evolved principally
from the experiences of two world wars. At the turn of the present century,
writers viewed traditional international law as not limiting resort to highly
intense military violence. Rather, their principal focus was regulating the
relations between participants, and between participants and non-partici-
pants, once aggression had been committed, and war had broken
out. Whether this traditional view was an accurate statement of state
practice is open to question. Within Europe, the dominant powers did judge
the permissibility or impermissibility of resort to military force, and did
take remedial actions to redress the balance of power once it was threat-
ened.
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Whatever the permissibility or impermissibility of aggression and war in
the nineteenth century, World War I resulted in the first significant attempt
by the world community to limit resort to the more highly intense forms of
coercion in international relations. Mindful of the vast destruction and
violence of that war, the drafters of the Covenant of the League of Nations
sought to impose on its members, "obligations not to resort to war".
2 1
Each member of the League thus undertook to "preserve against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence" of
other League members. 22 Each member was also required to take certain
procedural steps before employing military force; the assumption being
that a delay in resort to violence would tranquilize the contenders. The
League Council, further, was authorized to make recommendations to each
of the members of the League in the event of war, or a threat of war.
The League Covenant, however, did not eliminate the possibility that a
member could legally resort to war. As a theoretical matter, a member
complying with the procedural requirements of the Covenant could law-
fully employ high levels of military coercion against a target state. To close
the supposed gaps in the Covenant, the signatories of the Pact of.Paris
renounced "war as an instrument of national policy", and undertook to
settle disputes by "peaceful means". 23 League practice, supplemented by
bilateral and multilateral treaty commitments to avoid aggression, affirmed
the community consensus that it was illegal for an attacking state to
employ extensive military force (except in self-defense or pursuant to a
League decision) to acquire or destroy substantial resources of or in a
target state.
The Soviet Union participated in this community consensus about the
illegality of extensive use of military force against a target state. Its draft
definition of aggression, 24 submitted to the Disarmament Conference of the
League of Nations in 1933, made clear that an "aggressor" was that State
which was the first to invade, bombard or blockade a target state. Under
the Soviet definition, armed attack was almost impermissible per se; it
could not be justified on grounds that the target state repudiated its debts to
21LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, preamble.
22LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 10.
23Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Briand-Kellog Pact), August 27, 1928, in BRIGGS,
supra note 41 at 968.
24J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 34-5 (1958) (hereinafter cited as AGGRES-
SION AND WORLD ORDER). For a more recent Soviet definition of aggression, see Id. at 201-2,
and Report of the 1956 Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, U.N.
GAOR, 12th Sess., U.N. Doc A/3574 at 30-1 (1957). The Soviet Union has also concluded
both bilateral and multilateral treaties prohibiting aggression. See AGGRESSION AND WORLD
ORDER at 2 12-3.
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the attacking state, infringed the privileges of the diplomatic representa-
tives of that state, or illegally restricted the rights of the citizens of the
attacking state.
The vast destruction of World War I1, and the failure of the League
system, did not mean community abandonment of attempts to proscribe
aggression. The Allied response to Axis aggression, the Nuremburg judg-
ments, the numerous post-war alliances, and, most importantly, the United
Nations Charter, reaffirmed the illegality of highly intense coercion em-
ployed against a target state. Members of the United Nations, thus, under-
took to refrain from the "threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state". 25 The Charter drafters
further envisioned that the Security Council, with armed force eventually
at its disposal, might take both provisional and enforcement measures in
the event of a "breach of the peace", a "threat to the peace" or an "act of
aggression". 26 These terms extend Council jurisdiction beyond instances of
"aggression", as traditionally conceived, and permit the Council to review
all relevant facts before recommending or deciding upon a solution for a
particular dispute.27
Despite the abortive efforts to define "aggression", and the shift in
authority from the Security Council to the General Assembly, the United
Nations has in practice reaffirmed the illegality of major coercions, i.e., the
extensive use of military force (other than in self-defense or pursuant to a
United Nations decision) to acquire or destroy substantial resources of or
in a target state.28 The United Nations action in Korea, the General
Assembly resolutions condemning the intervention in Hungary in 1956,
and several other General Assembly resolutions, 29 are sufficient proof of
this point.
In summary, it is aggression and therefore illegal to employ extensive
military force and violence (except in self-defense or pursuant to a United
Nations decision) to acquire or destroy substantial resources of or in a
target state. In the words of one noted scholar, lesser degrees of coercion
25 U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
26 U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
27M. McDougal & W. Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of
International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. I, 6-9 (1968).28For an excellent discussion of United Nations practice relating to permissible and
impermissible coercion, see R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (hereinafter cited as HIGGINS)
167-228 (1963).29E.g., the Peace through Deeds Resolution, General Assembly Resolution 380 (V),
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950); the Essentials of Peace Resolution, U.N.
GAOR 4th Sess., Report of the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/] 150 and Corr. I in Annex at
231,233-4, and U.N. GAOR, 261st Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 261 at 438-9 (1949).
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are also "impermissible" if the coercion is of such order and proportions as
reasonably to bring about expectations in the target state of the
insufficiency of non-military countermeasures and of an immediate necessi-
ty for a military response. 30 To determine the legality of even lower
degrees of coercion, a brief impressionistic examination of the doctrines of
intervention is given hereunder.
2) INTERVENTION
Contemporary doctrines about the legality or illegality of intervention
have their principal roots in two historical trends.3 ' The first is the coming
of age of the Latin American republics, the consolidation of United States
power on the North American continent, and the shift of United States
policy from "dollar diplomacy" to the "good neighbor policy". The second
is the attempt to replace the European "balance of power" system, which
had proven incapable of maintaining modest stability in Europe by the turn
of the twentieth century, with international organizations that were en-
trusted, in varying degrees, with the maintenance of international peace
and security.
(a) Intervention in the Americas
In the early nineteenth century the European powers on numerous
occasions employed military force-in the form of armed invasion and
temporary occupation, naval blockade, seizure of governmental institutions
(most particularly, customs)-against several Latin American nations. To-
ward the end of that century, European interventions in the Americas
decreased in number and in the coerciveness of the armed forces em-
ployed, and the United States replaced the European states as the principal
intervening state in Latin America. Its principal method of intervention
was by the dispatch of armed forces, most notably, the Marines, but it also
used the techniques of naval bombardment, pacific blockade and embargo.
The stated goals of both European and United States interventions were
generally quite similar: the enforcement of contract debts owed by the
target state to nationals; the redress of treaty violations; and the protection
of nationals against disturbances within the target state, and against denials
of justice, illegal seizures of their property and illegal detention.
30MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 20 at 200. See also J. Moore, The Lawfullness of
Military Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam, 61 AM. J. INT'I L. 7 (1967).31The most comprehensive recent study of the legality and illegality of intervention is A.
THOMAS & A. THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION (1956) (hereinafter cited as THOMAS &
THOMAS).
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During this period, North American and European jurists fashioned two
blanket doctrines to justify the often disparate types of intervention. "In-
tervention for the protection of lives and liberty of citizens abroad", as-
serted some, was legally justifiable, presumably as an exercise of "sover-
eignty" by the intervening state.32 "Humanitarian intervention" was per-
missible when the acts of a target state, in the words of two noted com-
mentators, were "contrary to the laws of humanity." 33
Latin American diplomats and jurists, as might be expected, were equal-
ly creative in fashioning doctrines that asserted the illegality of inter-
vention. By 1868 Dr. Calvo had enunciated the doctrine that bears his
name; it held illegal armed intervention by one state to enforce the private
claims of its citizens. Attempts to codify the Calvo doctrine were made
throughout the first decades of the twentieth century, but failed principally
because of United States opposition. 34
Disputes about the legality of the 19th and early 20th century inter-
ventions in the Americas were put to rest in 1933, when the Sixth Inter-
national Conference of the American States adopted the Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States. Article 8 of that Convention read: "No state
has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another." 35 Prior to
World War 11, other Latin American conferences, and the practice of the
United States, reaffirmed this principle. The principle, however, took its
most elaborate form in the Charter of the Organization of American States,
which asserted: 36
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form
of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic and cultural elements.
32THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 31 at 303-358.
33See generally THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 31 at 372-390; BROWNLIE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 338 (1963); E. STOWELL, INTERVENTION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 ff. (1921); MOORE, 6 INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 347-367
(1906); L. OPPENHEIM, (Lauterpacht, ed.) I INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 12-3 (1955), (hereinafter
cited as OPPENHEIM).3 4 0ne exception was The Hague Convention II of 1907, which prohibited recourse to
armed force for the recovery of contract debts. This obligation, however, did not apply when
the debtor state refused to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, if it accepted the arbitration,
rendered settlement impossible. It also did not apply when the debtor state failed to submit to
an arbitral award. See generally OPPENHEIM, supra note 33 at 309, note 3, and the remarks of
Secretary of State Root to the United States Delegation to The Hague Convention, reprinted
in M. WHITEMAN, V DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 413 (1965).
The history of the Latin American attempt to obtain a United States commitment to the
principle of non-intervention is set forth in THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 31 at 55-64.35Quoted in THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 31 at 62.
3 6CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES art. 15.
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It is not to be thought that this principle proscribed coercive use of military
force that was in fact a legitimate exercise of the right to self-defense.37 At
the time of the drafting of the OAS Charter, it was also clear that certain
non-coercive methods of interaction -diplomatic protest, non-recogni-
tion- would not be considered forms of intervention.38 Use of armed force
under OAS auspices, finally, was to be permissible.
(b) Intervention in Europe
From the demise of Napoleon's Continental System until the outbreak
of World War 1, the European community was in general agreement that
intervention was legal, whether the intervention took the form of armed
invasion and temporary occupation, naval blockade, or bombardment. To
some extent the goals of intervening powers paralleled the goals of the
European powers in the Americas, namely, the protection of nationals
against deprivations imposed by lesser-developed target states. More im-
portantly, intervention in Europe aimed at suppressing possible threats to
the balance of power, most particularly, revolutions, and attempts by
European states to extend their territorial base. A premise of the Congress
of Vienna was that a balance of power should be maintained on the
Continent; and the inevitable corollary was that intervention was per-
missible to maintain this balance. Use of military force was a permissible
method to reach this goal, and to bring back into the European system
certain "disturbed areas", i.e., States "eliminated" from the European
alliance because their "internal structures" had undergone an "alteration
brought about by revolt". 39 By such reasoning, and by the use of armed
force, the monarchies of Spain and Naples were restored, and at a later
date, the Austro-Hungarian empire was saved from disintegration. During
this period, as one noted scholar has put it, "intervention was the order of
the day". 40
3 7See Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) art. 3 in THOMAS &
THOMAS, supra note 3 1, at 435, 437, and the remarks of Professor A. A. Berle, who played an
instrumental role in drafting the OAS Charter, in A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC CRISIS 1965 (1967) at 100.38 A. Freeman, Recent Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and the Challenge to International
Law, 40 AM.J. INT'L L. 121 (1946).39Excerpted from the Protocol of Troppau (1820), quoted in R. PALMER & J. COLTON, A
HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 450 (1965).
40C. Fenwick, Intervention: Individual and Collective, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 644, 649
(1945).
The thirty-year period following the Congress of Berlin saw no major attempt at limiting the
general view that intervention was permissible. Europe was at peace; in Europe, thus, the
question of the permissibility or impermissibility of intervention was moot. In Africa and
Asia, where both the European powers and the United States were engaged in colonial
competition and expansion, but few local authorities invoked international law, and no
significant doctrines of impermissible intervention developed.
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Community consensus about the illegality of certain types of inter-
vention began to congeal after the First World War. Although the drafters
of the League Covenant focused principally on the more highly intense
forms of coercion, they did not overlook lesser forms of inter-state coer-
cion. Article 12 of the Covenant, thus, specified that League Members
could submit to the Council "for inquiry" disputes that were "likely" to
lead to a "rupture". Decision about the permissibility or impermissibility of
intervention could thus be entrusted to an international body, which, in the
authoritative statement of a Special Committee of Jurists, was to decide
immediately, having due regard to all the circumstances of the case and the
nature of the (coercive) measures adopted, whether it should recommend
the maintenance or the withdrawal of such measures. 41 Subsequent to
1923,42 both the practice of the League, and the writings of the majority of
jurists, confirmed that any coercive use by members of armed force (except
in self-defense or pursuant to League decision) would contravene the
Covenant, even if the use of force could not be labelled "aggression" or
"war". 43 The Pact of Paris of 1928, in supplement of this principle, re-
quired signatories to settle "all conflicts", whatever "their nature or ori-
gin", by the techniques of pacific settlement. In the period following World
War I, even the Soviet Union accepted the principle that the use of armed
force against a target state (other than in self-defense) was a form of
impermissible intervention.44
It was the United Nations Charter, however, that crystallized an inter-
national consensus about the impermissibility of certain types of inter-
vention. Article 2(4) requires Members "to refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State". The terms "threat or use of force"
clearly envision that coercive use of armed force is unlawful; more im-
portantly, the Charter drafters noted that other types of coercion fell within
the proscription of Article 2(4). 45 A determination of the permissibility of
41Quoted in H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS (hereinafter cited as BRIGGS), 961-2
(1952).421n 1923 an Italian cruiser bombarded, and landed an expeditionary force on the Greek
island of Corfu to retaliate against a Greek failure to meet the Italian demands pressed after
the assassination in Greece of the Italian General Tellini and four of his aides. The League
handled the matter "supinely." BRIGGS, su1pra note 41 at 960 see also E. COLBERT, RETALI-
ATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 81-87 (1948).43The literature is summarized in BRIGGS, supra note 41 at 962-3.
"4See the provisions of the Soviet treaties cited in AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER,
supra note 24 at 212-3, and Article 3 of the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression of June
24, 1931 between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 157 L.N.T.S. 371 (1931). That article
proscribed both armed and unarmed intervention.45 At San Francisco, Committee I/I reported that "(t)he unilateral use of force or similar
coercive neasures is not authorized or admitted." Report of Rapporteur of Commission I to
Plenary Session, 6 U.N.C.I.O. 245, 247 (1945).
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coercion, further, was not to take place in a vacuum. The terms "territorial
integrity and political independence" are of broad scope, and permit
analysis of the impacts of a "threat or use of force" on such varied factors
as the resources of a target state, the freedom of decision of its officials, the
authority and control exercised by its institutions, its leadership or in-
stitutional structures, etc.46
The Charter also granted the Security Council more far-reaching juris-
diction to determine the permissibility of interventions than the Covenant
had given to the League Council. Under the Charter, the Security Council
has authority to "investigate" disputes which might lead to international
friction; it may also take "provisional measures" or "enforcement action"
to resolve "threats to the peace" or "breaches of the peace". The Assem-
bly, too, has more explicit powers to determine the permissibility of inter-
ventions than did its League counterpart. The Assembly's competence in
the maintenance of international peace and security, as is well known,
increased with its passage of the "Uniting for Peace Resolution". 47
United Nations practice in dispute contexts has expanded the concept of
"impermissible intervention" to include, not only armed incursions against
a target state, but also the organization by an intervening state of volun-
teers to participate in military actions against a target state,48 the mainte-
nance of irregular troops in a target state,49 the training by an intervening
state of refugees to engage in guerilla war in a target state,50 and the
furnishing of arms and other supplies to guerillas operating in a target
state.51 In each of these cases relatively high levels of coercion were
directed against the political independence or territorial integrity of a target
state.
Apart from its actions in particular dispute situations, the United Na-
tions, in a variety of ways, has emphasized the world community's prefer-
ence for peaceful change, and its abhorrence of impermissible intervention.
46 For analyses of the factors relevant to determining whether intervention has occurred,
see W. Burke, The Legal Regulation of Minor International Coercion: A Framework of
Inquiry, in Falk, ed., THE VIErNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (1968).
47 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 377 (V). See generally MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO,
supra note 19 at 252-3; HIGGINS, supra note 28 at 227-8.48See General Assembly Resolution 498 (V).49E.g., the presence of Nationalist Chinese troops in Burma, condemned by General
Assembly Resolution 707 (VII), based on a draft resolution to be found in "Report of the
First Committee", U.S. Doc. A/2391, U.N. GAOR 7th Session Annexes, Agenda Item 77 at
4, and adopted at U.N. GAOR, 428th Meeting, U.N. Doc A/PV.428 (1953). See also U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 815 (IX), based on a draft resolution to be found in "Report of
'Ad Hoc' Political Committee", U.N. Doc A/2762, U.N. GAOR, 9th Session, Annexes,
Agenda Item 63, at 10. See also HIGGINS, supra note 28 at 184.
5 0
H IGGINS, supra note 28 at 189-95.511d.
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The General Assembly has repeatedly affirmed Member obligations to
comply with the Charter Article that proscribes the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of a target state.
One of the more important of these General Assembly resolutions, which
was sponsored by Czechoslovakia in 1965, reads in part as follows: 52
I. No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently,
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and
cultural elements, are condemned.
2. No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it
advantages of any kind. Also no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance,
incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed toward the
violent overthrow of the r6gime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in
another State.
In summary, during the last four decades it has been illegal for an
attacking state, unless acting in self-defense or pursuant to United Nations
decision, to employ military force, at relatively intense levels of coercion,
substantially to limit the freedom of decision of the officials of a target
state, to work modest changes in its institutional or leadership structures,
or significantly to restrict a target state from obtaining access to or utilizing
its resources. Indeed, in recent years it has become clear that, in certain
circumstances, a non-military "threat or use of force" against the "territo-
rial independence or political integrity" of a target state may also be
unlawful. 53 These proscriptions may expand in scope as the world becomes
increasingly interdependent to embrace even moderate levels of coercion,
whether military, ideological or economic, which is directed against a target
state.
3) AGGRESSION, INTERVENTION AND THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
That the Warsaw Pact invaders directed highly intense coercion against
the territorial integrity and political independence of Czechoslovakia is
indisputable; a brief review of th& aftermath of the invasion will be proof
enough of this point.
An initial goal of the Warsaw Pact invaders was to use armed force to
work changes in the leadership structures of Czechoslovakia. On the morn-
ing of August 2 1st, Soviet troops entered the Central Committee building,
52 General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX).53 See generally B. MURTY, PROPAGANDA AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1968).
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and seized Dubcek, National Assembly President Smrkovsky, and Central
Committee member Kriegal. The Soviet troops forced the three Czech
leaders from the building. One report indicates that Dubcek was injected
with a sedative. The Czech leaders were led into armored cars, where they
were bound with rope and then transported to a resort. Elsewhere Soviet
troops "arrested" Premier Cernik, led him handcuffed from his office, and
took him to join his colleagues. Treatment was so harsh during the ensuing
period of internment that Premier Cernik "feared for (his) life and that of
(his) comrades". 54 At approximately the time when Dubcek and the others
were seized, Messrs. Indra and Lenart sought President Svoboda's approv-
al of a "provisional Government of workers and peasants".
The Warsaw Pact invaders also directed intense pressure against the
Czech leaders during negotiations in Moscow from August 23rd to 26th.
These negotiations, in Mr. Smrkovsky's words, occurred "in the shadow of
tanks and planes". 55 When President Svoboda refused to negotiate in Mr.
Dubcek's absence, Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Cernik and Kriegal were flown to
Moscow and presented (still bound) to Mr. Brezhnev-a technique hardly
appropriate as a preliminary to a "frank and comradely" negotiating ses-
sion. During negotiations, Brezhnev apparently threatened "absorption" of
Czechoslovakia into the Soviet Union, and the "destruction" of the 14
million inhabitants of Czechoslovakia. So intense was the Soviet pressure
that, according to one report, President Svoboda, perhaps to secure a
foothold in the bargaining, drew a revolver and threatened to kill himself.
But the techniques of Soviet pressure are best illustrated in the commu-
niqu6 issued after the Moscow negotiations: it recorded an "agreement"
that the Warsaw Pact troops would be withdrawn only "as the situation" in
Czechoslovakia should be "normalized".
"Normalization" -with the troops of the Warsaw Pact invaders in
Czechoslovak territory-has been a euphemism for the coercive limitation
of freedom of decision by Czech officials. First, Secretary Dubcek has
noted that "since the August events it has become inevitable to adopt
(certain) more serious measures". 56 When explaining the results of the
Moscow negotiations to the Czechoslovak National Assembly, Assembly
President Smrkovsky noted that the Assembly would be "forced" to take
"exceptional measures" vis-6.-vis the press, radio and television. Measures
which would "result in the dissolution of the political clubs", and which
54SZULC, supra note t, at 6, col. 4.551d. at col. 8.56The quotations in this paragraph are from the translations of Czechoslovak radio
broadcasts referred to in note t, supra; Mr. Smrkovsky's statements also appear in THE
BLACK BOOK, supra note t.
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would "prevent additional political parties from being formed", were also
"required" of the Assembly. Emergency powers, continued Mr.
Smrkovsky, "will have to be granted" to the Government. All these mea-
sures were "indispensable" with a view to the "normalization of the situ-
ation" and the "departure of foreign troops". Failure to implement the
Moscow agreements, in language attributed to Soviet special envoy Kuz-
netsov, would mean that "unforeseeable consequences may ensue".
Intense levels of coercion were also directed at Czechoslovak govern-
mental institutions and the Czechoslovak people.5 7 Immediately after the
invasion, the troops of the Warsaw Pact invaders seized television and
radio stations, and major newspaper facilities. Although Warsaw Pact
troops appeared reluctant to use their weapons against the citizens of
Czechoslovakia, some 70 individuals died in consequence of the invasion.
During the first two months of "normalization" following the invasion, this
pattern of coercion continued. Suffice it to note the more blatant examples.
Thus, the Soviet Union "insisted" on the dismissal of key Czech leaders,
including Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek and Interior Minister Pelikan. Soviet
troops dispossessed soldiers of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The
Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia pressured the Justice Ministry to
initiate trials against "counterrevolutionary elements", and the Commander
57Certain bills passed by the National Assembly in the fall of 1968 illustrate the extent to
which the Moscow agreements restricted Czechoslovak political independence, and limited
the policy alternatives open to the Czechoslovak leaders. A bill reinstating censorship gave
the relevant "Office for Press and Information" the right directly or through authorized
persons to prevent publication in the periodical press or other mass information media of
information containing facts that are at variance with the vital interests of the domestic or
foreign policy of the state. A "temporary measure to strengthen public order" authorized the
Government "to dissolve" organizational meetings if a meeting "might disturb important state
interests", or "runs counter to the law", or "is directed against the socialist order", or "in any
other way threatens public order". Could broader mandates for repression have been devised?
"Instruction No. I for press, radio and television" also reveals the degree of force used by
the Soviet Union during the Moscow negotiations, and, at the same time, its intolerance of
any publicity of its coercive techniques. This Instruction, which Bratislava Pravda reprinted
from the weekly POLITI KA, reads in part as follows:
On the basis of the conclusions of the Moscow talks, the government is laying down the
following obligatory guidelines for directing the content of press, radio and television:
"I1-Not to publish anything that could be taken as criticism of the Soviet Union, the
Polish People's Republic, the GDR, the Bulgarian People's Republic, the Hungarian
People's Republic, or the communist parties in these countries. Not to publish anything
that could be construed as attacking the basis of socialism, the Czechoslovak Communist
Party, other political parties, the system and position of the National Front, and the
position of our army and security. This also concerns information from abroad.
"2-Not to publish information and articles attacking the foreign military units on the
territory of our state and causing conflicts and action against them.
"3-Not to use the term occupation and occupiers."
The quotations in this footnote are from TRANSLATIONS.
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. I
60 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
of the Warsaw Pact invaders threatened to send troops into the schools of
Czechoslovakia if school teachers did not adopt a "more favorable attitude
toward the Soviet Union". 5 8 In the economic sphere, the Soviet Union
appears to have forced the Czechoslovak government to abandon its plans
to have workers participate in factory management. In the realm of politics
the Soviet Union sought and obtained a commitment to declare invalid the
extraordinary 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.
There is, however, no need to belabor the obvious. By using the pres-
ence of Warsaw Pact troops on Czech territory to exert military leverage
on Czech leaders, the Warsaw Pact invaders used the threat of force to
curtail the freedom of decision of these leaders, and to work fundamental
changes in the composition and policies of Czechoslovak institutions. Un-
less the invasion is justified by doctrines of permissible coercion, it was and
is clearly illegal. Whether it is illegal because it was an "aggression" or
"intervention" is a question that is almost academic; so intense was the
coercion employed that it could aptly be characterized by either concept. It
would not be correct to label the invasion an "intervention" or an "aggres-
sion", however, if it were justified by international law doctrines defining
"permissible coercions".
B. Permissible Coercion
It is axiomatic that not every crossing of state borders by military forces
is coercive, and that not every modestly forceful or highly intense use of
military forces against a target state is illegal. Permissible coercions cover a
broad range. At the one extreme is the minimal degree of coercion nor-
mally found in state relations. At the other is the use of high levels of force
in self-defense, or in fulfillment of a sanctioning decision of a community
organization.
The principal Soviet justifications for the Czechoslovak invasion focus
on all these types of permissible coercion. An initial justification claims
that there was no coercion employed in the invasion (or only coercion of a
minimal degree) because Czechoslovak authorities "invited" or "con-
sented" to the presence of the Warsaw Pact troops. A second argument
insists that the invasion was a lawful exercise of the invaders' rights to
self-defense, and a third claims the invasion to have been justified because
it was taken pursuant to joint decision within a regional organization. A
final argument submits that the foregoing history of the doctrines of aggres-
sion and intervention is incorrect, and that in the last two decades a "rule
58C. Farnsworth, Soviet in Warning on Czech Schools, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1968, at I,
col. 3.
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of the game" has developed which permits the Soviet Union to employ
coercion against potentially defecting members of the Soviet bloc. (To the
best of the author's knowledge, neither the Soviet Union nor any of the
other Warsaw Pact invaders has attempted a careful exposition of these
arguments, with citation to relevant precepts of international law.)
1) INVITATION OR CONSENT OF THE TARGET STATE
A principal justification of the invasion of Czechoslovakia insists that
Czechoslovak authorities invited its Warsaw Pact allies to assist in the
suppression of "counterrevolutionary" elements in Czechoslovakia.5"
Traditional international law holds that it is legal for the government of
one state to "render assistance" to the "established legitimate government
of another state with a view (toward) enabling it to suppress an insurrection
against its authority". 60 Historically, "assistance" may be rendered either
on invitation by an established legitimate government, or with the consent
of that government.61 Rendering such "assistance", however, has tradi-
tionally been thought to be illegal when a rebellion in the recipient state has
passed the bounds of insurrection or insurgency, and has become bellig-
erency. 62
That these traditional conceptions require modification for contemporary
purposes is beyond question. Leading scholars, mindful of the principles of
self-determination and the possibility that "honest home-grown" rebellion
might lead to "international conflagration", have begun to work modest
changes in the traditional doctrine63-changes that restrict the opportu-
nities of one state to deploy its forces upon the invitation or with the
consent of another state. For present purposes, however, let us assume the
validity of the traditional doctrine. That doctrine, in modest fashion, sought
to limit coercion in international relations by permitting one state to render
military assistance to another only if (inter alia) two conditions were met:
I) factual inquiry must disclose some form of "invitation" for or consent to
the military actions of that state; and 2) the invitation or consent must be
59See the TASS Statement printed in Pravda and Izvestia on Aug. 21, 1968 at I,
translated in XX(34) CDSP 3 (1968).60Garner, Questions of international Law in the Spanish Civil War 31 AM. J. INT'L L.
66, 68 (1937).
6 1THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 31 at 22.62R. Falk, Janus Tormented: the International Law of Internal War, in Rosenau, ed.
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL STRIFE 185, 196-7; McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note
19 at 194, footnote 164; Q. Wright, United States Intervention in the Lebanon, 53 Am. J.
INT'L L. 112, 119-25 (1959); HIGGINS, supra note 28 at 211. Some writers assert that
intervention to suppress even a nascent rebellion is unlawful. See E. Lauterpacht, Inter-
vention by Invitation, 7 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 102, 103 (1958).
63CJ W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 271
(1964); MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 19 at 192-3, footnote 164.
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from the established government of the state in whose territory the military
forces were to be deployed. Neither of these conditions was met when the
troops of the Warsaw Pact invaders entered Czechoslovakia.
Immediately after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Soviet leaders pro-
duced an "Appeal to the Czechoslovak People" authored by a "Group of
Members of the CCP Central Committee, the CSR Government, and the
National Assembly".6 4 The Appeal's authors stated that they had "taken
on (themselves) the initiative of rallying all patriotic forces (i.e. the Warsaw
Pact troops) in the nam 6 of (their) socialist future and (their) homeland". 65
The Appeal nicely complemented the TASS assertion that "party and state
leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have requested the Soviet
Union and other allied states to give the fraternal Czechoslovak people
immediate assistance, including assistance with armed forces".
66
There is every evidence, however, that the Appeal was a fabrication. It
had no signatories, and apparently no Czechoslovak has admitted to sign-
ing it. It is inconceivable that President Svoboda, First Secretary Dubcek,
Premier Cernik, Foreign Minister Hajek, or National Assembly President
Smrkovsky authorized it. In the statements following the invasion, none of
the principal organs of the CCP or the Czechoslovak government admitted
to its authorship. 67 The leading Soviet candidates for a "new" Presidium,
Messrs. Indra, Holder and Bilak, did not sign the Appeal, even though
under considerable Soviet pressure-to do so on August 21, 1968. Indeed, in
October a Moscow pamphlet entitled "On the Events in Czechoslovakia"
made no reference to the "invitation" when justifying the invasion. In
short, the "invitation", on the basis of contemporary evidence, may well
have been a Soviet creation.
It is also not to be assumed that the Czechoslovak people or government
consented to the invasion. Immediately following the attack, authoritative
Czech organs denounced the invasion as illegal, and the extraordinary 14th
Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia demanded speedy
withdrawal of the occupation forces. Popular abhorrence of the invasion
was demonstrated by the failure of the Soviet Union to organize a con-
servative "puppet" government.
64 Printed in Pravada, Aug. 22, 1968 at I, and translated in XX(34) CDSP 3-5 (1968).651d. at 4.66 Printed in Pravda, Aug. 21, 1968 at I and translated in XX(34)CDSP 3 (1968).67The 26th Extraordinary Plenary Session of the National Assembly declared that no
constitutional organ .... has been empowered to discuss the arrival of foreign troops, nor (has
a constitutional organ) ... approved any such discussion, nor has (any constitutional organ)
invited the occupation troops of the five states of the Warsaw Pact.
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Consent to the invasion, further, cannot be deduced from events in the
months after the invasion. Mention has been made above at the intense
levels of coercion directed in Moscow at the Czech leaders to obtain a
commitment to "normalization". It is true that the Czech National Assem-
bly ratified a treaty authorizing the stationing of Soviet forces on Czech
soil ,68 and that Article 2 of that Treaty (which by its terms is not retro-
active) stipulates that the "temporary presence of Soviet troops in the
territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic does not violate its sover-
eignty". However, this treaty is also a result of the agreements reached in
Moscow from August 23 to August 26; and to the foregoing discussion for
evidence of the high levels of coercion directed at Czech leaders to obtain
a commitment that this treaty would be signed. No precept in international
law requires that forced acceptance of the Soviet presence be characterized
as "consent" to that presence.6 9
In summary, there is no substance to an argument that the invasion of
Czechoslovakia is permissible because Czechoslovak authorities "invited"
or "consented" to the entry into Czechoslovakia of the Warsaw Pact
invaders.
2) SELF-DEFENSE
The Soviet justifications of the Czechoslovak invasion have all urged
that the invasion was an exercise of the rights to "individual" and "collec-
tive self-defense". In its initial commentaries on the invasion, the Soviet
Union claimed that the Warsaw Pact invaders were defending themselves
or Czechoslovakia against "external forces hostile to socialism" which
were acting "in collusion" with "counterrevolutionary forces" in Czech-
oslovakia. 70 In subsequent writings, 71 they found a different type of threat
to the socialist camp. Their argument, paraphrased broadly, is as follows:
Czechoslovakia occupies a key geographical position in the Soviet bloc.
On the one hand, it borders both West Germany and the Soviet Union; on
68Treaty between U.S.S.R. Government and the C.S.R. Government on the Conditions
for the Temporary Stationing of Soviet Troops on C.S.R. Territory, printed in Pravda, Oct.
19, 1968 at I and translated in XX (42) CDSP 1-2 (1968).
"Just the opposite is the case: the treaty is "without legal effect" and "void". The
International Law Commission stated the established rule in Articles 48 and 49 of the DRAI-T
ARTICLES ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 277, 406-9 (1967). See also LORD
MCNAIR'S THE LAW OF TREATIES (1961) at 209-10 on the transformation of the traditional
views regarding the validity-of treaties obtained by coercion.7 0See the TASS Statement translated in XX(34) CDSP at 3 (1968).71S. Kovalev, Sovereignty and the Internationalist Obligations of Socialist Countries,
Pravda, Sept. 26, at 4, translated in XX(39) CDSP 10 (1968), and N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1968
at 3.
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the other, it separates key European communist states. Despite Czech
protests to the contrary, the liberalization of the spring and summer of
1968 might have led to a shift in the allegiances of its peoples from the
Soviet bloc to the Western European countries. This shift would have
drastically altered the balance of power in Europe, which is premised on
the fact, concurred in by the Western powers, that Soviet borders are and
should be protected against the West European states by a buffer of its
"junior allies". Altering the balance of power might have meant that West
Germany could mount an armed attack against the Soviet Union from just
across its borders. A "neutral" Czechoslovakia might also have permitted
army infiltration of the Soviet bloc by the Western powers. Liberalization
in Czechoslovakia did threaten the Soviet bloc. To eliminate this threat,
the argument concludes, the Warsaw Pact invaders exercised their inherent
right of self-defense, and invaded Czechoslovakia.
Customary international law has long recognized a right to self-defense,
but not without limitations.7 2 In its classic statement, recourse to
self-defense was legitimate only when there was a "necessity of
self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation"; the actions taken in self-defense, further must
involve "nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the
necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept
closely within it". 73 An anticipatory right of self-defense did exist in tradi-
tional international law, but actions in self-defense had to be in necessary
response to actual coercion or a threat of imminent coercion, and had to be
proportional, or reasonably related to the scope and degree of force em-
ployed by the attacking state. 74 The twin requirements of necessity and
proportionality, it should be noted, are but a corollary of the community
preference for peaceful change. It was failure to meet these requirements
that led the Lytton Commission to declare illegal the Japanese invasion of
Manchuria in 193 1, and the Nuremburg Tribunal to hold that the German
invasion of Norway in 1940 was not a justifiable action in self-defense.
It has been urged strongly that the United Nations Charter worked a
fundamental change in the traditional concept of self-defense, eliminating
the right to anticipatory self-defense, and restricting the use of force in
72See generally MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 20 at 207 et seq.; D. BOWETT,
SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958) (hereinafter cited as BOWETT).73The statement is Secretary of State Webster's, and is quoted in BRIGGS, supra note 41
at 985.
74 BOWETT, supra note 72 at 269; BROWNLIE, supra note 33 at 257, 261; P. JESSUP, A
MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166 (1948); MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 19 at 217 ff.;
D. O'CONNELL, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 343 (1965).
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self-defense to respond to armed attack. The argument, in brief summary,
is as follows: Article 2(4) of the Charter requires members to refrain from
the use or threat of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of a target state. Article 51 of the Charter creates an exception to
this basic principle; it provides that no provision in the Charter is to impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in case of armed
attack. A corollary to this exception is that use of force in self-defense
against a threat of intense coercion, but not an armed attack, is inconsistent
with the overriding principle of Article 2(4). The employment of high levels
of coercion in self-defense is thus unlawful unless taken in response to an
armed attack. Against these standards, of course, the invasion of Czech-
oslovakia cannot be justified as an action in self-defense, because Czech-
oslovakia had not mounted an armed attack against the Warsaw Pact
invaders.
This syllogistic limitation on the traditional right of self-defense, how-
ever, ignores the history of Articles 2(4) and 51. The authors of Article
2(4) noted that the right of self-defense remained "unaffected" and "unim-
paired" by the language of Article 2(4). 75 The drafting history of Article
5 1, further, reveals no considered attempt to limit the customary right to
anticipatory self-defense. Speeches interpreting the final draft of Article 5 1,
for example, refer to the inherent right of self-defense against aggression,
rather than armed attack. Article 5 1, it will be remembered, was an attempt
to provide some autonomy for regional organizations, and not an effort to
legislate changes in the customary law of self-defense.
By itself, the legislative history of both Articles 2(4) and 51 is persuasive
that the traditional right of §elf-defense remains unimpaired. It is, however,
inconclusive, for the process of Charter interpretation extends beyond
examination of textual materials and their travaux preparatoires. When
interpreting a constitutional document like the United Nations Charter, the
principal goal of interpretation is to ascertain the genuine shared ex-
pectations of the document's framers, and to temper these expectations by
taking into account overriding community policies at the time of inter-
pretation. 76 It hardly bears mention that several nations in the contempor-
ary world possess weapons of vast destructive capability, together with
vehicles to deliver these weapons in a matter of seconds. It is inconceiv-
75 Report of Rapporteur of Committee I to Commission 1, 6 U.N.C.I.0. Docs 446, 459
(1945); approved in the Report of Rapporteur of Commission I to Plenary Session, 6
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 245, 246 (1955).
76 M. MCDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, 1967; 0. Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances
(Rebus Sic Stantibus), 61 AM. J. INT'L. L. 895, 986-7 (1967).
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able that the Charter framers would have expected a target state to await a
devastating blow before responding in self-defense. Contemporary policy
militates against this result. Recognizing this fact, some scholars have
claimed that an armed attack may begin when a missile is launched, or
crosses the territorial borders of an attacking state. Others, in more forth-
right fashion, have rightly noted that it does not make "sense"
77 to
require that target states await a final blow "in the posture of sitting
ducks". 78
To assert that the traditional right of self-defense remains unimpaired is
not, of course, to open Pandora's box to multiple factitious claims by
attacking states that their actions are in anticipatory self-defense. The
requirements of necessity and proportionality do impose limitations on the
right to self-defense, and do permit officials and scholars to judge the
legitimacy of claims to anticipatory self-defense. 79 United Nations practice
supports this conclusion. When Israel invaded Egypt in 1956, it asserted
that its goals were to block further fedayeen raids from Egyptian territory.
Members of the United Nations, however, felt that the invasion was a
disproportionate response to the feyadeen raids, and condemned Israel.80
The Council reached similar conclusions about the Israeli commando at-
tack against the Beirut airport in 1968.
The claim to self-defense by the Warsaw Pact invaders does not meet
the 'equirements of necessity and proportionality. The requirement of
necessity demands, in the case of anticipated attack, a high degree of
imminence. To such imminence existed prior to the invasion of Czech-
oslovakia. Certainly there is no evidence that Czechoslovakia was about
to, or did, threaten to use force against the Warsaw Pact invaders. The
Soviet Union did assert that "external hostile forces" were acting "in
collusion" with "counterrevolutionary forces" in Czechoslovakia. As evi-
dence, it claimed the existence of "hidden arms caches" and "illegally
operating radio transmitters" in Czechoslovakia, provocational statements
by "Western" radio stations, diplomats and academicians, and the "in-
filtration" of Czech borders by armed "counterrevolutionaries" (presum-
77C. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International
Law, 81 (11) Recueil des Cours 451, 498 (1952). Professor Henkin has also accepted this
view. See L. Henkin, International Law and The Behavior of Nations, 114 (11) Recueil des
Cours 168, 265 (1965 II). See also MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 19 at 238-41.
78M. MCDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 27 at 8.
79For an excellent example of the type of contextual analysis, see M. McDougal, The
Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597 (1963).
"°See, e.g., The remarks of Mr. Lall of India and Mr. Trujillo of Ecuador at U.N.
GAOR, 562nd Meeting (First Emergency Special Session), U.N. Doc. A/PV. 562 (1956) at
25, 31 respectively.
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ably Czech refugees) and "spies and saboteurs" dispatched by "imperialist
intelligence agencies."
The Soviet Union, however, has yet to offer proof of these allegations
(other than to point to "inflammatory" articles and other publications in the
Western press, and to "inciting" speeches by Western diplomats). Further,
in recent months, Czech authorities have stated that the so-called "hidden
arms caches" actually belonged to the Czechoslovak People's Militia; and
these authorities have also denied the existence of "illegally operating radio
transmitters". During the same period, the Warsaw Pact invaders did not
"produce" "armed" Czechoslovak "counterrevolutionaries" or "Western"
"spies" or "saboteurs". Indeed, the Czechoslovak authorities have
adopted a policy of not staging trials of "counterrevolutionaries." The
Soviet Union, finally, went to considerable lengths to promise the security
of the Western state that it had claimed was the principal sponsor of
"external forces" that acted "in collusion" with counterrevolutionaries in
Czechoslovakia.
It also does violence to the requirement of necessity, to claim, as has the
Soviet Union, that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was justified by the
eventual threat to the Soviet Union to be caused by the "neutralization" of
Czechoslovakia. This threat is obviously far too remote to support a claim
to anticipatory self-defense. Too many contingencies intrude between the
threat and its realization. At the least, Czechoslovakia would have had to
become "neutral" or "pro-Western". Prior to the August invasion, how-
ever, official pronouncements did affirm that the "basic orientation" of
Czechoslovakia's foreign policy was "in alliance and cooperation with the
Soviet Union and other socialistic states".81 Czechoslovak authorities had
not renounced the Warsaw Pact, as did the Nagy Government in Hungary
in 1956. Even if Czechoslovakia did become "pro-Western", it would not
follow that the Western European countries would use it as a "corridor" to
mount a direct or indirect attack against the Soviet Union. Indeed, assum-
ing that the West European countries would so use a "neutral" Czech-
oslovakia-a thoroughly implausible assumption-it still would be possible
for the Soviet Union to take appropriate action in self-defense at the time
that the attack appeared imminent. But there is no need to parade these
contingencies. In an age in which most powers can inflict inestimable
damage on others in a matter of seconds, it makes little sense to justify a
claim to anticipatory self-defense by devising a scenario that might take
half a decade to unfold.
81ACTION PROGRAM, supra note 13 at 173.
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Let us assume, however, that in August of 1968 there were "counter-
revolutionary elements" in Czechoslovakia, that "hostile forces" were
acting "in collusion" with them, and that the possibility of Czechoslovak
"neutralism" did pose an "imminent threat" to the fundamental interests of
the Soviet bloc. Even on these gratuitous assumptions, the invasion would
not meet the strict standards of proportionality. The number of troops
entering Czechoslovakia, estimated at 500,000 to 650,000, was obviously
far in excess of the number required to uproot the 40,000 "counter-
revolutionaries" which the Soviet Union believed to be operating in Czech-
oslovakia. (It must be remembered that the Czechoslovak Army, which
numbered approximately 200,000, was loyal to the regime, and more than
adequate for this task.) The armor and firepower possessed by the Warsaw
Pact invaders was vastly disproportionate to the threat posed by an unspe-
cified number of "hostile external forces", "spies" and "saboteurs". More
importantly, if the purpose of the invasion was to protect the Soviet bloc
from a potential threat from the West European countries, it would have
been sufficient to seal off Czechoslovakia's Western borders. Certainly
500,000 troops were not needed for this purpose. If Israel's invasion of
Egypt in 1956 was not in reasonable response to the fedayeen raids
directed against it from Egyptian territory, it is obvious that, by com-
parison, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was vastly dis-
proportionate to any possible threat to the security of the Soviet bloc.
There is thus no basis for a claim to self-defense by any of the Warsaw
Pact invaders.
3) PERMISSIBLE ACTIONS THROUGH REGIONAL AGENCIES AND
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE
A third justification asserts that the invasion was a legitimate action of a
regional agency. It argues that the deployment of Warsaw Pact forces in
Czechoslovakia was a lawful dispute-settling exercise of authority by a
regional organization. Alternatively, it insists that the invasion was a legiti-
mate action "in collective self-defense" "in conformity with existing treaty
obligations".
The first of these arguments can be stated most strongly by reworking
the analysis which State Department legal experts used to justify the
Cuban quarantine.8 2 As a preliminary, let us assume that the Joint Com-
mand of the Warsaw Pact decided, pursuant to Article 5 of the Warsaw
Treaty, that the invasion was an "agreed measure" "necessary to strength-
82A. Chayes, The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba, 47 Dept. of State Bull. 763
(1962); L. Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 514 (1963).
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en" the "defensive power" of the Treaty signatories, to "guarantee the
inviolability of their frontiers", and to "provide defense against possible
aggression". Let us further assume that the Joint Command decision was
"recommendatory" in form and substance.
The argument begins by asserting that the invasion was an action author-
ized by a regional organization and was consistent with the United Nations
Charter. It 'is well known that members may resort to these agencies when
seeking solutions to disputes that the Security Council is to encourage
pacific settlement of "local disputes" through regional organizations, and
that the Security Council may utilize regional organizations for "enforce-
ment actions". There are two principal limitations on the authority of these
agencies. Regional agencies may deal with "matters relating to the mainte-
nance of international peace and security" provided only that "their activi-
ties are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Na-
tions."83 Regional agencies, further, may not take "enforcement actions"
without the authorization of the Security Council. 84
Neither of these limitations, the argument continues, is applicable to the
deployment of Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia. The troop deploy-
ment was not an "enforcement action" requiring prior authorization by the
Security Council. The Charter, Security Council practice, and a decision of
the International Court of Justice all make clear that "enforcement ac-
tions" are Security Council decisions which are obligatory and involve the
use of armed force. "Enforcement actions" do not include United Nations
measures which are merely "recommendatory". Although Article 53(1)
refers to enforcement actions by regional agencies, rather than by organs of
the United Nations, the "words are properly given the same meaning in
this context". 85 "Recommendatory" actions by regional agencies are thus
distinguished from "obligatory" decisions, with only the latter, as "enforce-
ment actions", requiring prior Security Council authorization. Since the
(assumed) Joint Command decision was "recommendatory", and was thus
not an "enforcement action" requiring prior Security Council author-
ization, the deployment of Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia was in
accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter.
The troop deployment, the argument continues, was also consistent with
the Purposes and Principles of the Charter: Article 1(1), for example,
authorizes "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace". The troop deployment did not violate other Purposes
83U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para. 1.
84U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. I.
8Meeker, supra note 82 at 521.
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and Principles. Article 2(4), properly read, proscribes only those threats or
uses of force which are inconsistent with the Charter. The Warsaw Pact
action, as previously noted, was in accordance with Chapter VIII of the
Charter; it thus falls outside the prohibitions of Article 2(4). It follows, the
argument concludes, that the Warsaw Pact troop deployment in Czech-
oslovakia was lawful.
This argument rests on a highly gratuitous assumption of fact. In actual-
ity there is no evidence that the Joint Command of the Warsaw Pact did
make a "recommendatory" decision to deploy Pact forces in Czech-
oslovakia.
More importantly, the argument misconceives the role of regional organ-
izations in the United Nations system, both as that role was envisioned
by the Charter framers, and as it has developed in United Nations practice.
After heated debate of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, which clearly
subordinated regional organizations to the Security Council, the Charter
framers granted regional organizations a measure of primary responsibility
in two areas. The first was the peaceful settlement of local disputes, where
regional organizations were authorized to employ persuasion and, presum-
ably, only low levels of coercion. The second involved actions in "collec-
tive self-defense." In these latter circumstances regional organizations
could employ high levels of coercion until the Security Council took
appropriate remedial actions against the attacking state. When functioning
in both these areas, regional organizations were to report to the Security
Council. There was no need, however, to obtain the Council's prior ap-
proval.
The Charter framers used several techniques to insure that the Security
Council would have authority and control over other actions of regional
agencies, most particularly, the employment of high levels of force other
than in collective self-defense. The Security Council, for example, had
jurisdiction over coercive activities by regional agencies which were
"threats" to the peace" or "breaches of the peace".
A second control device was to require Security Council "author-
ization" before regional agencies undertook "enforcement actions". At San
Francisco, the core content of the "enforcement action" concept was
beyond dispute: it referred to Security Council decisions which were bind-
ing on United Nations members, and which directed the employment of
moderate to high levels of coercion against a target state. The Charter
framers, however, did not grapple with the conceptual problems of apply-
ing the "enforcement-action" concept to the actions of regional agencies.86
86See, e.g., Report of Mr. Paul-Boncour, Rapporteur on Chapter VIII, Section B, 12
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 502, 505-14 (1945).
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Perhaps because of this, the "enforcement-action" concept, as applied to
regional agencies, has atrophied in United Nations practice. When debating
the legitimacy of regional-agency actions, the Council has gradually shifted
from analysis of the meaning of "enforcement action", and from decision
as to whether Security Council authorization should precede, be contempo-
raneous with, or follow the actions of a regional agency. Instead, the
Council has viewed regional-agency action in the broader context of per-
missible and impermissible coercion. In practice, debate about "enforce-
ment actions" has shaded into study of whether a particular action by a
regional agency has violated the Charter's prohibitions against the threat or
use of force against the political independence or territorial integrity of a
target state.87
The prohibitions in the Charter against the threat or use of force are the
third device chosen by its framers to regulate the activities of regional
agencies. Article 52 of the Charter, thus, requires that the activities of
regional agencies be consistent with the Principles and Purposes of the
United Nations Charter. Among the Principles is Article 2(4) which, as has
already been noted, requires Members to refrain from using force or the
threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a
target state. Employment of high levels of coercion by regional agencies
(other than in self-defense or pursuant to Security Council authorization)
was thus contrary to the Charter, and, in the view of the framers, the
Security Council could intervene to take appropriate corrective action. 88
In practice the United Nations has basically honored the framers' alloca-
tion of functions between its organs and regional organizations. Thus,
regional organizations have assisted in the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes, 89 and have employed moderate levels of coercion in self-defense, 90
without obtaining the prior authorization of the Security Council. In the
one case-Hungary in 1956-in which highly intense coercion was em-
ployed against a target state under the supposed aegis of a regional arrange-
87See generally, L. SOHN, CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW (1967) at 862 ff., and, in
particular, the remarks of Mr. Beeley of the United Kingdom at 951-2 and Mr. Morozov of
the Soviet Union at 984, 987.
88The phrase in Article 2(4)- "or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations"-was inserted in the Charter to "insure that there should be no loop-
hole" 6 U.N.C.I.O. 335 (1945). It is a travesty of both the "ordinary meaning" of Article
2(4) and its travaux preparatories to read this phrase as qualifying the general prohibition of
the threat or use of force in international relations against the political independence or
territorial integrity of a target state.
89E.g., The Dominican Republic in 1965. For further comment on this situation, cf.
footnote 100 infra.
9 See Resolution I of The Sixth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
of the OAS, quoted in SOHN, supra note 87 at 939.
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ment, 9' the Soviet veto on the Security Council prevented the Council
from condemning the use of coercion. There is no question that Council
authorization of the employment of coercion would not have been forth-
coming.
It follows that a regional organization, unless acting in collective
self-defense or pursuant to a Security Council resolution, may not lawfully
direct highly intense coercion against a target state. Any such employment
of coercion would be inconsistent with Article 2(4) of the Charter. There
was, of course, no explicit Council authorization of the invasion of Czech-
oslovakia. Tacit consent to the invasion cannot be deduced from the
Security Council actions in late August 1968; a Soviet veto, indeed, pre-
vented a majority of the Council from condemning the invasion. 92 The
actions of the Warsaw Pact invaders, thus, are in violation of Article 2(4)
of the Charter and illegal unless, of course, the invasion was an action in
collective self-defense. We are thus led to the second aspect of the "region-
al-agency" justification of the Czechoslovak invasion, namely, that it was a
lawful action in collective self-defense in conformity with existing treaty
obligations.
Rational policy-making requires, as a general proposition, that more
rigorous standards govern the legality of an action in collective self-defense
than in an action in individual self-defense. A threat of force against a
cohesive regional grouping will probably be of less consequence than an
equivalent threat directed at a single member. The group will usually have
greater aggregate military and non-military resources as its disposal than
any one of its members. In consequence, one noted authority has suggested
that it may be appropriate to require a higher degree of imminence of
attack, and more exacting evidence of compelling necessity, for coercive
response by the group as such than would reasonably be demanded if the
responding participant were a single state.93
The invasion of Czechoslovakia then, measured by these standards, was
clearly not a lawful action in collective self-defense. The transparent failure
of the Soviet Union to justify the invasion as a legitimate exercise of its
right to individual self-defense has been noted supra. Given the more
rigorous application of the requirements of proportionality and necessity to
actions in collective self-defense, it follows, a fortiori, that the Warsaw
91See the remarks of Mr. Sobolev of Russia, U.N. SCOR, 754th meeting, U.N. Doc.
S/PV. 754 at 10 (1956).
9 2 T'he draft resolution (U.N. Doc. S/8761, Aug. 22, 1968) condemned "the armed
intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other members of the Warsaw
Pact in the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic..." The vote was 10
(Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Paraguay, Senegal, United Kingdom,
United States): 2 (Hungary, USSR): 3 (Algeria, India, Pakistan).93 MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 19 at 251.
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Pact invaders have not met the tests of necessity and proportionality, that
the invasion cannot be justified on the ground of collective self-defense,
and that the invasion was unlawful.
C. Rules of the Game
In mid-September, 1968, the Soviet Union published its ideological
justification of the invasion. 94 It noted that, although the Soviet bloc "re-
spects" the "democratic norms of international law", these norms must be
"subordinated" to the "laws of the class struggle and the laws of social
development". One of these laws of the class struggle requires deference to
"proletarian internationalism", the "rallying of all forces and sections of
the international working class in an effort to implement their common
international class objectives". Respect for "proletarian internationalism",
however, must not lead one to overlook the "main contradiction" of the
age, namely, the "struggle" between "socialism" and "imperialism". This
"struggle", in view of the immense destructive capability of contemporary
weapons, must be tempered for the moment by the principle of "peaceful
co-existence". For the present, then, the doctrines of "proletarian inter-
nationalism" must stop (at least temporarily) at the borders of the socialist
camp. Within these borders, they supercede "bourgeois" notions of "inter-
national law", "self-determination" and "sovereignty", and in fact author-
ized the Soviet bloc to wage a struggle not in words but in deeds for the
principles of self-determination of Czechoslovakia's peoples, (and) for their
inalienable right to decide their destiny for themselves after profound and
careful consideration. 95
This argument deserves statement in more familiar terms. It asserts that
"rules of the game" developed between the Soviet bloc and the Western
world after Churchill and Stalin "negotiated" the post-World-War-I divi-
sion of Europe. One such rule is that neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union may interfere or intervene directly or indirectly in the other's
"sphere of influence"; the corollary to this rule is that either power, within
its "sphere of influence", may take whatever measures it deems necessary
to safeguard the integrity of its own bloc. This rule, asserts one com-
mentator, is the "ultimate lesson of Hungary in 1956".96
94S. Kovalev, Sovereignty and the Internationalist Obligations of Socialist Countries,
Pravda, Sept. 26, 1968 at 4, translated in XX (39) CDSP 10-12 (1968). The paraphrasing of
this article includes statements appearing in an East German justification of the invasion.
95 1d. at 1I.
9 6E. MCWHINNEY, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND SOVIET-WESTERN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 94 (1964).
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The "spheres-of-influence" rule, the argument continues, is of long stand-
ing. It has its roots in the Western failure after World War 1I to oppose
Soviet tampering with the East European revolutions. The Western re-
sponse to Soviet actions in East Germany in 1953, in Poland and Hungary
in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, all evidence the West's acceptance
of the rule as a matter of practice. The rule, further, is reciprocal. Apart
from verbal harangues, the Soviet Union did not significantly oppose
United States assistance to the Guatemalan rebels in 1954, or the invaders
of Cuba in 1960. The Soviet Union violated the rule in the fall of 1962
when it installed offensive ground-to-ground missiles in Cuba, but the
United States enforcement of the rule-by means of the Cuban quaran-
tine-led to Soviet withdrawal of the missiles.
This rule, the argument concludes, is firmly embedded in the ex-
pectations of the contemporary world community, and will doubtless be
honored in future decisions. As such, it takes on the character of custom-
ary international law. Since the action by the Warsaw Pact invaders is
within the scope of this rule, it is thus legal.
This argument, too, misstates the criteria for determining when "usage"
or a "moral norm" becomes "customary law", and overlooks significant
aspects of the history of the last two decades. In the opinion of most
jurists, 97 two elements are essential to establish a norm of customary
international law. A "material" element demands past uniformity in state
behavior, and a "psychological" element requires that a certain degree of
"oughtness" attend these behavior patterns. Commentators traditionally
find this degree of "oughtness" in state expectations that a rule is "legally
obligatory", "legally right", or "legally binding", or in state actions taken
"in fulfillment of a legal obligation". Not all states must have adhered to a
particular custom, or have attributed the required degree of "oughtness" to
it, for a rule of international law to develop. The custom, however, must be
generally accepted.
In more scientific terms, five steps are essential for the formation of a
rule of customary international law:98
"(i) the formulation and designation of a requirement as to behavior in contin-
gent circumstances
"(ii) an indication that that designation has been made by persons recognized as
having the competence (authority or legitimate role) to perform that func-
tion and in accordance with procedures accepted as proper for that pur-
Dose
97C. HYDE, I. INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd ed.) 4 (1945); J. Kunz, The Nature of
Customary International Law, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 662 (1953); M. McDOUGAL, H. LAS-
SWELL, I. VLASIC, Law and Public Order in Space 115 (1963).
980. Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 300,
308 (1968).
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"(iii) an indication of the capacity and willingness of those concerned to make
the designated requirement effective in fact
"(iv) the transmittal of the requirement to those to whom it is addressed (the
target audience)
"(v) the creation in the target audience of responses-both psychological and
operational -which indicate that the designated requirement is regarded as
authoritative [in the sense specificed in (iii) above] and as likely to be
complied with in the future in some substantial degree."
It is readily apparent that the "spheres-of-influence" rule has not be-
come a rule of customary international law. It does not possess the re-
quired degree of "oughtness"; it is not generally regarded as "legally
obligatory" or "legally binding"; and it does not state an "authoritative"
requirement of behavior that has been accepted as such by its target
audience. The United States has repeatedly protested the assumption that
the Soviet Union has an exclusive "sphere of influence" in Eastern Eu-
rope.99 The general world community denied the existence of such a
"sphere of influence" when it condemned Soviet interventions in Hungary
in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Countless General Assembly resolu-
tions have affirmed that major coercion is prohibited, regardless of whether
it occurs within or without a particular "sphere of influence". To state that
the "spheres-of-influence" rule has become a norm of customary inter-
national law is to equate a temporary deference to power with a general
community understanding that a long-standing custom, with a sound basis
in policy, may be honored in future decisions.
III Conclusion
The flagrant violation of international law by the Warsaw Pact invaders
is in striking contrast to the disorganized and almost complacent Western
response to the invasion. That the Warsaw Pact invaders employed force
unlawfully is beyond dispute; yet the Western powers chose not to use the
United Nations to label the invasion illegal, or to impose community-wide
sanctions on the invaders. The obvious disparity between the gross unlaw-
fulness of the invasion, and the minimal sanctions imposed on the invaders,
raises a host of questions for the concerned lawyer:
Are the doctrines of "aggression", "intervention" and "self-defense"
adequate in a world marked by a high degree or interdependence, a great
variety of military weapons, and numerous economic, diplomatic, ideolog-
ical and military techniques for exerting high levels of coercion against
target states? Was the Western response to the invasion a breakdown in
99D. Rusk, Some Myths and Misconceptions About U.S. Foreign Policy, 59 Dept. of
State Bull. 350, 351 (1968).
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the traditional sanctioning process? Or is the traditional model of the
sanctioning process-which assumes that a "delict" will be followed by a
roughly proportionate "sanction"-simply inapplicable to a bi- or tri- polar
world?
It is impossible to attribute the passive Western response to the in-
vasion, to supposed defects in the doctrines of "aggression", "inter-
vention" and "self-defense". It is true that scholars and diplomats have
bemoaned the generality of these doctrines, noting that the same troop
movements, in one context, may constitute "aggression", and in another,
"self-defense". Several august bodies have also been unable to agree on
definitions of these terms.
It is not to be assumed, however, that these doctrines, any more than
other general legal concepts, spare decision-makers the very difficult prob-
lems of finding the relevant facts, and then evaluating these facts in relation
to the policies underlying the basic legal doctrines. It should also not be
thought that these doctrines are any more susceptible than other general
legal concepts, to rigid definitions that anticipate all future contingencies.
The doctrines, as has been demonstrated, do have a "core" content. At
their "penumbra" they require examination of varying degrees of coercion,
and analysis of a sequence of events; they do not restrict focus to isolated
"military" events, but rather demand a full contextual analysis. In con-
sequence they permit careful factual distinctions between events which, at
first glance, may appear quite similar.100 Certainly in their application to
10 This is not believed to be an appropriate context in which to examine the complex
factual and legal issues surrounding the "intervention" by the United States in the Dominican
Republic in 1965. Suffice it to note that a careful analysis reveals significant differences
between that "intervention" and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Thus, after the first week of
both crises, the Warsaw Pact invaders had twenty-five times as many troops in Czech-
oslovakia as the United States did in the Dominican Republic. The Warsaw Pact invasion was
largely a reaction to the "liberalization" policies of an established government. The United
States action occurred in a country torn by revolution, with two factions contending for
power. The principal goal of the Warsaw Pact invaders was to arrest, and perhaps reverse,
this trend toward liberalization. The goals of the United States in the Dominican Republic
were initially to safeguard the lives of United States citizens, and then to mediate between the
two hostile factions in the hope of forming a broadly representative government. A secondary
goal of the United States-apparently founded on inadequate information-was to avert the
possibility of a Communist takeover in the Dominican Republic; to achieve this goal, the
United States clearly gave modest support to the more conservative of the two factions.
The strategies of the two countries were also in marked contrast. The Soviet Union clearly
employed intense coercion, both against the leaders of Czechoslovakia, and against its
government institutions. The United States for the most part attempted to separate the two
rival factions to avoid unnecessary destruction of life and property. In supporting the more
conservative of the two factions, the United States did employ low levels of coercion to
influence the outcome of the struggle for power; for example, it jammed the radio of the
Caamano faction, and did not impede (and perhaps assisted) the military actions of the Imbert
faction. But these levels of coercion are far lower than those employed by the Soviet Union in
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the invasion of Czechoslovakia the doctrines yield incontrovertible con-
clusions.
If it is incorrect to blame the passive Western response to the invasion
on defects in the doctrines of international law, it is myopic to view the
sanctioning process by focusing only on events occurring in Western capi-
tals immediately after the invasion. Pertinent historical materials are not
yet available, but it may be appropriate to suggest that the community
consensus about the unlawfulness of aggression and intervention had a
modest deterrent effect on Soviet leaders. The Soviet Union did not move
against Czechoslovakia in mid-summer, 1968, even though it had massive
numbers of troops on Czech borders. Mikhail Suslov apparently opposed
the invasion, correctly estimating that the invasion might alienate Commu-
nist party leaders throughout the world. These leaders might not voice their
opposition to the invasion in the language of international law, but the
reasons for their opposition would doubtless touch on the policies under-
lying the international-law doctrines prohibiting major coercions. When the
invasion did occur, the troops of the Warsaw Five were apparently under
instructions not to use their weapons except in special circumstances. In
contrast, the Soviet troops in Hungary in 1956 engaged in much in-
discriminate shooting.
Events within Czechoslovakia also were part of the international sanc-
tioning process. The Czechoslovaks did not exercise their right to
self-defense; but a military confrontation with the Warsaw Pact invaders,
which outnumbered the Czechoslovak army roughly two to one, would
have meant incalculable losses of life and property. This is not to say that
the Czechoslovaks ignored the precepts of international law. Authoritative
Czechoslovak organs made repeated reference to international law to pro-
test the invasion and occupation. In both written and oral communications,
Czechoslovak officials took pains to dispute the "evidence" proffered by
the Soviet Union as justification for the invasion. It may even be that the
policies underlying the prohibitions against aggression and inter-
Czechoslovakia. There is no question that the United States could have routed the Caamano
faction, but it did not attempt to do this.
The outcomes of both "interventions" were also significantly different. The Soviet Union
succeeded in arresting the trend toward liberalization in Czechoslovakia; Soviet troops remain
in that country at the time of this writing (March, 1969). In the Dominican Republic, in
contrast, Hector Garcia Godoy, with the consent (in effect) of both the contending factions,
became President of a Provisional Government. Within six months after the outbreak of the
rebellion, all the Inter-American Peace Forces were withdrawn from the Dominican Republic.
This brief comparison, of course, does not exhaust the pertinent distinctions between the
Warsaw Pact and the United States "interventions". For additional facts, see T. SZULC,
DOMINICAN DIARY (1965), and the bibliographic materials cited in SOHN, supra note 87 at
1072.
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vention-the community preference for peaceful change, respect for state
sovereignty, etc.-have served as important moral supports for the
non-military, largely passive, but nevertheless effective Czechoslovak re-
sistance to the occupation.
Long-term Western reactions to the invasion also cannot be excluded
from a comprehensive view of the international sanctioning process. The
NATO defense system was strengthened and improved. It became less
likely that NATO members, after August 24, 1969, would submit notices
of withdrawal from that organization, or that the United States Congress
would pass legislation calling for troop reductions in Europe. Western
nations will doubtless be more circumspect in responding to Soviet propos-
als for a d6tente than might otherwise have been the case. Historians may
discover that the Soviet Union, anxious to renew the climate of detente,
appeared willing to make limited concessions to the West.
A comprehensive view of the sanctioning process, nevertheless, does
not explain away the almost apathetic Western response to the invasion. It
is possible to ascribe this response to institutional defects in the contempo-
rary international sanctioning process; certainly there is a wide gap be-
tween contemporary sanctioning institutions and the model international
peace plans that have been designed in the last several centuries. Even
within the bounds of contemporary realities, however, there were opportu-
nities for a firmer Western response to the invasion. A Western (or NATO)
invasion of Czechoslovakia might have been out of the question because of
the high probability that it would have led to general war. There may have
been some merit, however, in Mr. Kennan's suggestion that the United
States send 100,000 troops to West Germany on the understanding that
their presence would terminate only after the Warsaw Pact invaders with-
drew from Czechoslovakia. More effective use might have been made of
the United Nations. Although the Soviet veto would probably have
blocked substantive action in the Security Council, the General Assembly
might have passed resolutions imposing modest economic or diplomatic
sanctions on the Warsaw Pact invaders. After the Hungarian intervention
in 1956, it will be recalled, the General Assembly Credentials Committee
refused to recognize the credentials of the representative from Hungary.
Certainly the General Assembly could have passed a resolution con-
demning the invasion as a violation of the Charter.
In fact, the Western response to the invasion appears to have been
governed largely by a pre-invasion policy, namely, to avoid direct in-
volvement with Czechoslovakia in the hope of not provoking the Soviet
Union to increase pressure on that nation. Whether the invasion is proof of
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the success of this policy, or evidence of its failure, is open to question.
The invasion thus should prompt a re-examination of this policy, with
particular attention to the predicted trend toward Soviet, American and
Chinese "spheres of domination". Division of the world into three separate
regional groupings, with the dominant power in each group free to employ
high levels of coercion against any member of the group, is antithetical to
the purposes of the United Nations Charter, runs counter to a host of
doctrines of international law, and does violence to the developed rules
proscribing intervention and aggression. If it is impossible to combat the
"spheres of domination" concept with military, economic or diplomatic
strategies, it is critical to employ every available communications tech-
nique to mold a community consensus against acceptance of the concept.
International institutions should be employed whenever possible to reach
this end; the failure of the General Assembly to censure the Warsaw-Pact
invaders must not be allowed to repeat itself.
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